"Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius": Chapter 4b/5a

Russell was generous enough to rejoice that Wittgenstein's work was going well, despite the latter's dismissal of Russell's recent work. In the later summer of 1913, Wittgenstein felt he had made a breakthrough. This did nothing to allay his neuroses, however: on a trip to Norway with Pinsent, he was frequently difficult and sulky (Pinsent: "as bad. . . as people like Beethoven were"). He believed he would soon die and feared it would happen before he could correct the Theory of Types. Yet, thanks largely to Pinsent, he said that he had never enjoyed a holiday so much (Pinsent found it "trying").

Wittgenstein now got the idea of temporarily exiling himself to Norway for work, and to escape the effects his anxiety had on his contacts with others. According to the biographer, it is possible that Weininger's idea that love is strongest with a certain distance may have influenced his thinking on this point.

Russell reacted with horror to this idea:

"I said it would be dark, & he said he hated daylight. I said it would be lonely, & he said he prostituted his mind talking to intelligent people. I said he was mad & he said God preserve him from sanity. (God certainly will.)".

Before he left, Wittgenstein attempted to acquaint Russell with his latest work; partly because both suspected that he would not be able to work much longer - Wittgenstein, because he had a morbid conviction that he would soon die; Russell, because he thought Wittgenstein was going insane. Russell found Wittgenstein's oral explanations incomprehensible, but Wittgenstein was unwilling to present him with imperfect written work. At length, Russell succeeded in dragging the "Notes on Logic" from Wittgenstein. This work asserts that the claims of the theory of types cannot be "said", but must be "shown" with reference to the types of symbols that are used; Wittgenstein refers to the apparent truisms that in the symbolic language, "A is the same letter as A", "A is the same type of letter as B", and "A is different from x, y and z".

"Notes on Logic" also asserts what would be Wittgenstein's permanent convictions on the nature and role of philosophy. He claimed that it was

• descriptive, not deductive


• gives no pictures of reality


• cannot confirm or refute scientific investigation


• consists of logic (its basis) and metaphysics

In addition, he states that "epistemology is the philosophy of psychology" and that "distrust of grammar is the first requisite of philosophizing".

In Norway he found a refuge from the demands of bourgeois society; it was a productive period for him. At the same time, he was far from isolated, and he learned a good deal of Norwegian. In England, Russell was trying to make sense of the "Notes on Logic" in preparation for a lecture series. He wrote to Wittgenstein hoping for clarification on certain points. Wittgenstein replied impatiently.

Among the points he tried to clarify was why he thought the whole of logic had to be derivable from a single proposition. This conviction rested on the fact that certain propositions could be known to be true or false without considering the truth-value of their constituent parts. These are tautologies ("It is either raining or not raining") and contradictions ("It is both raining and not raining"). Wittgenstein argued that a rule could be stated in a proposition that would allow one to determine whether a proposition was a contradiction, a tautology, or neither. Such a proposition would be the basis for all logic, but it is necessary to assume that all true logical propositions are tautologies. Wittgenstein states that "all the propositions of logic are generalizations of tautologies [and vice versa]. There are no other logical propositions."

Russell viewed this as presenting the problem of how all tautologies can be shown to be such by a single method. He was later to tackle this problem by the truth table method.

At length, Wittgenstein's depression and anxiety returned. It increased when he visited his family during Christmas out of a conflicted sense of duty. An exchange of letters with Russell, in which Wittgenstein held forth on Russell's upcoming lectures with a perfectionism which brought forth a sharp reply from Russell, resulted in a letter from Wittgenstein intended to end their association. Wittgenstein changed his mind when Russell replied, repentant, but henceforth they were to eschew "value judgements" in their association and focus only on objective topics.

According to the biographer, Russell had deluded himself into thinking that it was their similarity which caused the problems. In his letters, Wittgenstein focussed instead on the differences. It is notable, also, that in their work on philosophy it had come to the point where Wittgenstein was reporting to Russell on Wittgenstein's work in bulletins, with little discussion.

"Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius": Chapter 4a

On his return from his trip with Pinsent, Wittgenstein at once took Russell to task for an article of his on the "religion of contemplation", a vague rhapsody on an impartial "freedom from the finite self" (Spinoza), which is supposed to "truth in thought", "justice in action, and universal love in feeling" (Russell). Wittgenstein considered this imprecision as intellectual treachery, a view which disturbed Russell because he half agreed.

Wittgenstein's conversations on logic with Russell grew increasingly fraught. He was prone to outbursts against his own and others' moral failings; He would "pace up and down in my [Russell's] room like a wild beast for three hours in agitated silence". "Once, Russell asked: 'Are you thinking about logic or your sins?' 'Both', Wittgenstein replied, and continued his pacing".

Drawn into a boat race one afternoon (and winning), he declared that it was vile, that he ought not to live, that he had accomplished nothing, etc.

His anxiety also sprang from his supposed unpopularity. However, he became well-liked by Keynes. At this time he was also accepted among the Apostles, despite his reservations (which were unheard of from the Apostles' perspective). Russell had his own reservations about Wittgenstein's inclusion among the Apostles; not only did he fear a quarrel, but he believed that Wittgenstein would object to the "stuffy" atmosphere of intrigue that pervaded the homosexual affairs that were rife among the society at the time. Russell himself disapproved of this. As it happened, Wittgenstein did in fact soon resign from the Apostles.

Wittgenstein's work on logic now led him to reject Russell's theory of types. He argued that "all theory of types must be done away with by a theory of symbolism showing that what seem to be different kinds of things are symbolised by different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one another's places". According to Wittgenstein, Russell's analysis of propositions such as "Socrates is mortal" into a formal structure which is a complex of "Socrates" and "mortality" implied the idea of Platonic forms, creating problems for the idea of a hierarchy of sets or classes.

Russell, however, had more or less abandoned logic and was concentrating on the existence of matter, which according to him had never been adequately been proven or disproven in philosophy. Wittgenstein was dismissive of this project because of Russell's plan of relating sense data to physical objects by means of functions, working from sense data. From now on their work diverged and Wittgenstein increasingly took the lead in the field of logic.

Not long afterwards, Russell stood as a candidate for a Women's Suffrage Party. Wittgenstein argued violently with Pinsent over the question, alleging that "all the women he knows are such idiots". Russell was pained by Wittgenstein's narrowness and thought him insufficiently civilized. Moreover, Russell thought Wittgenstein much too ferocious when confronted with incipient theories and inconclusive considerations which needed to be balanced; this held, too, for philosophical questions.

This ferocious exactitude led him to take to the last limit views which Russell was beginning to move away from, for example the notion that philosophical generalizations should be largely abandoned in favour of mathematical precision.

To the extent that he did not concentrate with almost monomaniacal intensity on the fundamental questions of logic - at one time both he and Russell feared for his sanity - he dealt more and more with Pinsent, who tolerated him well, while his relation to Russell became strained:

[Wittgenstein] came analysing all that goes wrong between him and me and I told him I thought it was only nerves on both sides and everything was all right at bottom. Then he said he never knew whether I was speaking the truth or being polite, so I got vexed and refused to say another word. He went on and on and on... At last I said sharply 'All you want is a little self-control.' Then at last he went away with an air of high tragedy.

At the level of philosophy, however, Wittgenstein was not to be dismissed. Wittgenstein made fundamental objections to the work Russell was now doing on epistemology. These finally caused Russell to abandon the work. Devastated, Russell concluded that he could no longer work on fundamental philosophical problems.

"Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius": Chapter 3c

Wittgenstein soon drew the attention of the coterie known as the Apostles - which included Russell and was then dominated by Strachey and Keynes - and duly became an "embryo" or candidate for membership. He also met David Pinsent, a former "embryo" who had not been elected; the two would come to be frequent companions.

The biographer argues that Wittgenstein's ethical views are Stoical in their insistence that external events were irrelevant provided one's soul remained untainted. Russell, however, apparently mistook Wittgenstein's ethics of impulse for an amoral attitude and could not fathom that Wittgenstein had different principles from his own, rather than merely a peculiar and pure personality. In this the biographer finds the roots of the later falling-out of Russell and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein would never debate or explicate his fundamental outlook; that this outlook should be common was the sine qua non for dialogue. Consequently his attitudes and pronouncements were often unintelligible to Russell. "When Russell told him he ... should also provide arguments for [his thought], he replied that arguments would spoil its beauty."

This worried Russell because he believed that others would also fail to understand Wittgenstein, whom he increasingly saw as his successor. "He gives me such a delightful lazy feeling that I can leave a whole department of difficult thought to him. . . It makes it easier for me to give up technical work".

Wittgenstein's obsessiveness (referred to as "fussiness" by Russell, Pinsent et al.) showed itself at this time in his demand for well-crafted but very simple furniture for his rooms at Cambridge and the large amount of clothing he packed for a trip with Pinsent. Perhaps the most notable incident involves a "splendid bounder" (in Pinsent's words) they met on the same trip. Wittgenstein took a violent dislike to this person's frivolity and tried to arrange to eat at a different time at the hotel to avoid him. He likewise refused to listen to the Richard Strauss part of a concert they attended.

"Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius": Chapter 3b

Unsure at first of Wittgenstein's level of ability, Russell grew to like him and was distinctly impressed with a manuscript he presented to him in 1912. Wittgenstein saw this as justifying his existence and was released from the suicidal ideation that had been with him for many years.

Russell, in turn, grew to see Wittgenstein as the figure who would carry his work forward. Wittgenstein became a member of Trinity College under Russell's supervision. Having no formal training in logic, he was to be coached by a certain W.E. Johnson. However, Johnson soon found Wittgenstein too much to bear ("at our first meeting he was teaching me"). Wittgenstein excitedly came to Russell, who tactfully hinted that Wittgenstein was being argumentative and an overbearing bore. Wittgenstein appeared able to bear this from Russell.

Russell repeatedly refers with admiration to Wittgenstein's intellectual "passion" in his writings, but also to his "cold analysis". In one phrase, he brings them together: "cold steel in the hand of passion". According to Russell, he had excellent manners, but abandoned them in argument. He also gleefully reports that Wittgenstein was "far more terrible with Christians than I am . . . F. [a monk] came to tea with him and W. at once attacked him - as I imagine, with absolute fury."
Wittgenstein described Beethoven as:

. . . 'cursing, howling and singing' over his new fugue; after a whole hour Beethoven came at last to the door, looking as if he had been fighting the devil, and having eaten nothing for 36 hours . . . That's the sort of man to be.

Wittgenstein's ethics at this time was based on the idea of an internal integrity, with reference to one's own impulses, rather than a morality based on external rules and principles. But while believing that one should be a creature of impulse, he had an overbearing sense of duty. Wittgenstein was now much happier, believing himself justified by his work on philosophy with Russell.

At the same time, Russell became increasingly anxious to retain Wittgenstein's approval - for example, of papers that Russell proposed to publish.

"Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius": Chapter 3a

During the the summer holidays of 1911, Wittgenstein travelled to discuss his plans for a book on philosophy with Frege, who, according to Wittgenstein, "wiped the floor with him". Frege did suggest that Wittgenstein should study with Russell at Cambridge.

At this time, Russell, exhausted from his work on the Principia, saw his role as communicating ideas and encouraging others to continue his intellectual work. He also wished to promote a mystical religion of contemplation in which one is to become "one with infinity", although he was already very much against theism. Much of the extant information about Wittgenstein from this time comes from Russell's letters to Ottoline Morrell, with whom he was having an affair at the time.

It seems that Wittgenstein was at pains to discover whether he had any talent for philosophy. The impression he made on Russell is apparent from Russell's letters:

. . . an unknown German appeared, speaking very little English but refusing to speak German . . .

I am much interested in my German, & shall hope to see a lot of him.

My German threatens to be an infliction, he came back with me after my lecture & argued till dinner-time - obstinate and perverse, but I think not stupid. [19. 10. 11]

My German engineer very argumentative and tiresome. He wouldn't admit that it was certain that there was not a rhinoceros in the room . . . came back and argued all the time I was dressing [1.11.11]

My German ex-engineer, as usual, maintained his thesis that there is nothing in the world except asserted propositions . . . [13.11.11]

My ferocious German came and argued at me after dinner. He is armour-plater against all assaults of reasoning. It is really rather a waste of time talking with him. [16.11.11]

"Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius": Chapter 2

When Wittgenstein went to study aeronautics, no aircraft had yet been in the air for a substantial period of time. Wittgenstein's early research was done with box kites at a meteorological station, using trial and error. His isolation, living at a roadside inn on the moor, caused him some discomfort. This was somewhat relieved by the arrival at the inn of the engineer William Eccles, who entered the common room and immediately started tidying up the books and papers scattered on the floor. They grew close and remained so until the Second World War.

At Manchester University, Wittgenstein had astonishing independence. He was not expected to gain a degree or follow a formal course, but could do his own research with the assistance of the professors. Here he became interested in pure mathematics and read Russell's The Principles of Mathematics, which further inspired him to neglect engineering and study mathematics.

According to Russell's book , mathematics and logic are fundamentally the same; mathematics could be derived from a small number of logical principles. This was contrary to the opinion of most philosophers. Russell was to attempt to show this by deriving all the necessary theorems in a subsequent volume. Eventually, it became the three-volume Principa Mathematica. During the printing of The Principles of Mathematics, Russell became aware that the German Frege had attempted the same thing.

Frege developed the notion of what are now called "sets" and claimed that every concept corresponds to a set. Russell realized that Frege's axioms lead to a paradox, namely in considering the question of whether a particular set - the set of all sets that do not belong to themselves - belongs to itself or not. Russell wrote to Frege proposing the "Theory of Types", by which types of objects exist in a hierarchy and all objects of a set must be of one type (therefore a set cannot be a member of itself). Russell himself was not content with this, since it is an ad hoc and not self-evident solution. Reading of this, Wittgenstein formulated a proposed solution which he sent to a friend of Russell's, but Russell apparently thought it unworkable.

At the same time, he was working on aircraft engines, but the fiddly nature of the work did not suit his nervous temperament and often caused him to "throw his arms around, stamp around and swear volubly in German". At length, in 1911, he succeeded in patenting a propeller engine design (having abandoned a jet design).

"Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius": Chapter 1

Wittgenstein's family were Jewish, but entirely assimilated into the Viennese Protetestant cultural and religious environment. The family cultivated classical tastes and cultural skills and were acquainted with Mahler as well as Brahms, whose clarinet quintet premiered at their house. Wittgenstein always retained these tastes; he claimed that only six composers were great - Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms, and them obscure Labor, who was sponsored by the Wittgensteins - and would not listen to anything after Brahms, in whom he could already "hear the sound of machinery",

The family art collection included works by Klimt and Rodin. His father Karl was a rich, hard-headed industrialist who had got himself expelled at 17 for an essay denying the immortality of the soul and had run away to New York for a brief period. He eventually rose to a social status in which he could be accepted into the nobility.

Since Karl had married a Catholic, his eight children were raised Catholic. Ludwig was born in 1889. At this time the situation of the Austro-Hungarian empire was regarded as "desperate, but not serious", lurching from one crisis to another and remaining largely anti-liberal and attached to the status quo even as its own intellectuals were advancing ideas which would set the tone for the twentieth century.

Karl raised his older sons to become businessmen, much to their displeasure. One, Hans a talented musician, disappeared in 1903 and is presumed to have committed suicide. A second, Rudolph, took cyanide the following year, possibly because he was homosexual. Kurt would later shoot himself at the end of the First World War. To his credit, Karl changed his parenting methods after Hans disappeared. Paul, who lost his right arm in the war, was the famous beneficiary of Ravel's one-handed concerto, but his playing was regarded within the family as too flamboyant.

Ludwig, meanwhile, only started speaking at the age of four and showed no particular genius. Supposedly, he was a docile and compliant child, willing to be dishonest to earn a good opinion. The question of why one should tell the truth occurred to him at 9. This he regarded the first time he was inspired to philosophical contemplation. He lied about his Jewish background to gain access to a gymnastic club. He was sent to a Realschule (technically oriented school); it was feared he would not pass the entrance tests to a gymnasium. His performance was unremarkable: his only A's were gained in religious education and he got mostly C's and D's. He did not fit in among the working-class children, addressing them with the formal "Sie" and being regarded as pretentious. The school was also attended by Hitler, but there is no reason to suppose that the two encountered each other.

At this time he encountered the ideas of a certain Kraus, a Social Democrat and anti-Semite who insisted on the complete assimilation of all Jews. At the same time, Kraus relentlessly attacked the hypocrisy of the Austrian state and society on sexual morality, the timidity of the press in the face of the government, and the evils of Austrian capitalism and policy towards minorities. Told that his choice was the established order or the Left, he replied that given the choice between two evils he would choose neither. Given this attitude, his published articles turned increasingly from politial questions to moral ones.

His relentless honesty rubbed off on Wittgenstein, who also rejected Christianity at this time out of inability to believe all the doctrines. He also read the work of Schopenhauer, according to whom the everyday world is mere appearance and the ethical will is the only reality. He later turned away from this idealism and the solipsism which it leads to, but while composing the Tractatus he would refer to Schopenhauer again, believing he had found a point where idealism and realism coincide. Solipsism continued to haunt him thereafter.

Another influence on Wittgenstein was the contemporary cult figure Otto Weiniger, whose theatrical suicide brought him to fame and inspired a host of imitators. Wittgenstein imbibed a certain feeling of shame that he had not taken the same decision, feeling that he was de trop. Weininger's work, Sex and Character, denounced the modern world as decadent and in decline. The work is anti-Semitic and analyses everything in terms of masculine or feminine character. It describes women as largely unconscious, their thinking indistinguishable from feeling. By an involved argument, Weininger concludes that women are without souls, free will or individuality, obesessed with sexuality, amoral rather than good or evil. Judaism partakes of this "femininity", and similarly has no sense of good or evil (Weininger himself was Jewish). The work would later furnish material for Nazi propaganda.

The biographer argues that Wittgenstein's admiration for this work resides in its exposition of the "masculine" and ethical character. According to Weininger, logic and ethics and fundamentally similar because they rest on consciously discriminating between dialectical opposites. Men (unlike women) have free will and are responsible to choose the masculine, consciousness, will and love in contrast to their opposites: the feminine, unconsciousness, impulse and sexuality. They must acquire a soul by finding their "higher selves" and leaving their unreal "empirical selves". This can be done through Platonic love - preferably in the absence of a particular loved one. Man must love the idea of God, which Weininger identifies with his own soul.

In this Gnostic vision of the spiritual life, Weininger sees no need for the preservation of the human race or its communities. For those who are doomed to "feminine" or "Jewish" psychology and thus cannot attain "genius", the only right action must be suicide. Acquiring genius, in fact, is a Kantian categorical imperative. This mode of thought exercised a lasting influence on Wittgenstein.

Another work that influenced Wittgenstein was Hertz's work on Newtonian mechanics. Hertz opines that to understand "force" in Newtonian physics, the principles of physics should be restated without resorting to the concept of force. "When these painful contradictions are removed, the question as to the nature of force will not have been answered; but our minds, no longer vexes, will cease to ask illegitimate questions". This passage helped Wittgenstein to frame his approach to philosophy and he would often refer to it. Our models of the world are not derived from the phenomenal world, but taken to it, after the fashion of Kant.

When Wittgenstein left the Realschule, it was considered that he might study with Boltzmann, the Viennese Professor of Physics, through whose works Wittgenstein probably encountered Hertz. However, Boltzmann committed suicide and Wittgenstein went to a technical institute to study engineering instead. Little is known of his life at this time. Two years later he went to Manchester to study aeronautics.